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 Prototype Employment Zones: 






This study is one of a suite of evaluations into the Prototype Employment Zones (PEZs) 
established early in 1998.  PEZs aspired to bring local innovation and flexibility in 
addressing the problems of unemployed people aged over 25 who faced particular 
problems in entering the labour market.  PEZs occupied an important and distinctive 
position within the wider welfare-to-work and social inclusion effort by virtue of the 
strong emphasis which was placed on local partnership working and the development of 
a client-orientated approach.  Couched within an ethos of flexibility and innovation, the 
PEZs in many ways represented the leading edge of experimentation in welfare-to-work.  
The new initiative, marking a break with past practice, was to be concerned with ‘people 
not programmes’, rationalising and ‘joining up’ local provision, blending funding streams 
and streamlining procedures in the interests of clients.   
 
PEZ clients were expected to have been unemployed for at least 12 months, though 
certain categories of people could start from day one of their unemployment.  Clients 
could stay with the zone for a maximum of 12 months.  In addition to having a personal 
adviser, three forms of provision were to be made available to clients, Learning for 
Work, Neighbourhood Match and Business Enterprise. 
 
The research project was a longitudinal one, charting the ups and downs of the PEZs as 
a learning experience. During the course of the two years of research, we conducted 233 
interviews with partners and spoke to 187 clients. The overwhelming message was one of 
support for the PEZ approach – for partners and clients the initiative came as a breath of 
fresh air, marking a very real break from previous ‘schemes’ for the unemployed. Whilst 
mistakes were made, this is only to be expected in what was after all an experiment in 
welfare-to-work reform. Genuine innovation without risk does not exist, especially when 
it is expected to generate local experimentation with new forms of policy design. What is 
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 important is that the lessons are learnt from. It is clear that the local PEZ partners and 
workers did learn, refocusing their activities as the experiment evolved. Unfortunately, 
many partners felt that they had not been given sufficient time to experiment and learn 
in. Many partners and workers also argued that some of the criticisms they faced from 
central advisers and officials during the course of their work, whilst sometimes valid, 
were often premature, failing to take account of their experimental nature and involving 
prescriptive remedies imposed from above. Conversely, their very enthusiasm for the 
PEZ experiment blinded some partners and workers to their failings, making external 
guidance necessary to act as a corrective in guiding them to meeting the wider goals of 
the Government.  
 
As an experimental initiative, the main thing is to learn from the full range of what went 




 The broad aims of the PEZs generated widespread support and enthusiasm amongst 
local partnerships, clients, and PEZ workers. 
 Broad partnership support was achieved for systemic change, despite the fact that in 
many instances this has been disruptive of local organisational practice and 
established policy ‘turfs’. 
 Evidence in all partnerships of an emerging capacity to think flexibly and collectively, 
share knowledge, and recognise the various strategic and operational capabilities of 
those involved in the Zones. 
 Supportive and flexible approach on the part of ES locally; ES has become 
increasingly bound in to a local partnership approach in both strategic and 
operational terms. Partners tend to acknowledge ES as working with the community 
rather than simply in it. 
 Central direction from DfEE proved helpful in directing PEZs towards a more 
focused approach. Whilst this top-down approach did cause some resentment, in 
many cases a mixture of pragmatism and reflection led to an acceptance of the need 
for change. Better communications could have helped avoid some local tensions. 
 Real—as opposed to nominal—support of local partners and organisations takes 
time to build, but can evaporate quickly. 
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  Partnership working requires the effective separation of strategy from day-to-day 
operational issues. 
 Some alienation developed amongst key partners following changes in Employment 
Zones policy; a widespread feeling among partners was that the PEZs were ‘blighted’ 
by shifting national priorities. If ‘bottom-up’ policy development is to occur, there is 
a pressing need to improve lines of communication, and dialogue, between national 
policy-makers and local partners. 
 Tensions and misunderstandings did occasionally emerge amongst partnership 
organisations, particularly in terms of the ES role during the bidding process for 
FFEZs.  By contrast, the perception of local partners being unfairly treated by central 
government helped to bring partners together more strongly at the local level. 
 Involvement of non-core partners tended to be limited by the nature of the 
partnership and by their lack of available time and unclear roles. 
 Changes in national operating frameworks may have impeded continuity and long-
term planning, at the same time as helping improve focus on achieving key 
government goals.   
 
Managing the PEZ process 
 
 The PEZ remit was an ambitious one, which took longer than expected to realise; 
many partners argued strongly that their critics had failed to judge them over the 
whole of their lifespan. 
 A perceived failure to emphasise marketing and publicity, both to clients and to 
employers, or to pitch it at the right level, was noted.   
 Excessive bureaucracy impeded the work of advisers in particular for the first few 
months. To its credit, the ES nationally responded quickly to complaints, introducing 
a computerised system which helped streamline the process. 
 Systemic change at the local level requires a relatively long policy horizon and secure 
funding streams; uncertainty saps innovatory potential, while long-term objectives are 
not always compatible with short-term targets. 
 It is difficult conclusively to separate out the relative effects of participation rules, 
programme design, the personal adviser system, labour market conditions, etc. in 
what proved to be a short-term, multi-dimensional initiative. Much of the learning 
needs to be in how the elements knitted together. 
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  For some local partners and workers there was a tendency to highlight external 
causes for programme under-performance (‘flexibility denied’), when this may be just 
one of the factors at work. Following on from this, adverse local reactions to central 
government direction were sometimes initially over-sensitive. 
 A preoccupation with balancing the books as PEZs came to an end threatened to 
undermine their broader ethos. 
 The client-centred ‘employability’ approach takes a considerable amount of time to 
become embedded within the organisational culture of those dealing with the 
unemployed. 
 Innovation was restricted by a lack of creativity and/or expertise in the partnership, a 
tendency to ‘play it safe’, particularly once meeting targets was forced up the PEZ 
agenda. 
 Whilst community outreach was effective in some zones, notably Glasgow, in others 
it was relatively weak, whilst employer outreach work was generally under-developed, 
reflecting the fact that funding had not been ear-marked for this work. 
 Complex, multi-dimensional initiatives like the PEZ are difficult to evaluate 
conclusively, at least in the short term; policy messages are therefore never simple 
and unequivocal, even though they are sometimes interpreted in this way. 
 
Meeting client needs 
 
 Successful initiatives emerged aimed at targeting particular client groups—especially 
those with mental health problems and a long history of social exclusion, and those 
currently on probation. 
 Preparing individuals for entry into ‘real jobs’ can be a long-term process, involving 
the removal of multiple job-related and non-job related barriers.  Knitting together 
different aspects of provision in personally-tailored ways helped in addressing the 
complexity of some people’s barriers to employment. 
 Effective personal adviser systems were developed, demonstrating the benefits of 
‘relationship continuity’ both for clients and front-line workers and succeeding in 
conveying to clients a positive ‘message’ concerning the aims of the PEZ.  A mutual 
commitment to PEZs appears to have emerged between clients and advisers. 
 On-going learning experience in terms of managing client choice, linking provision 
more clearly to both client and labour market needs. 
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  Particularly in contrast to the previous ‘training for training’s sake’ system introduced 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, PEZ provision proved more responsive to the 
individual needs of clients who felt more in control of their own destiny. 
 The voluntary nature of PEZ was held by partners, clients and advisers to be a 
central feature of the success of the zones, improving the qualitative nature of 
relationships between clients and advisers, and clients and potential employers. 
 Clients noted a changing perception of ES local workers. Where previously the 
perception was often negative, of policing a punitive benefits system, increasingly a 
more positive stance was noted, of supporting quality labour market interventions. 
 A combination of limited funds to initiate new provision and the uneven quality of 
inherited local provision from previous initiatives placed real constraints on what 
could be achieved through innovations in advice and referral systems. 
 Local labour market conditions are important in shaping programme outcomes and 
design parameters, in particular where local demand deficit exists. 
 A growing willingness emerged amongst local partners and agencies to bend 
programme participation rules in order to meet individual needs. 
 Positive support from some businesses, although in general it proved difficult to find 
work placement opportunities for PEZ clients. 
 Early success in branding the PEZ as ‘something different’ with clients and (to a 
certain extent) local providers. This was linked to major progress in overcoming 
cynicism, fatalism and disinterest amongst many individual members of the client 
group. 
 Some success in developing new ILM provision and in convincing local partners of 
the value of ILM approaches; a secure basis has been established for the future 
development of ILM experiments (mostly through non-ES/DfEE programmes) 
 The Business Enterprise facet of the PEZs proved successful in many instances, but 
retained a low profile in terms of the available range of provision. 
 Valuable attempts were made to begin to construct prototype Personal Job Accounts, 











We are grateful to the many PEZ partners, clients and staff who found 
time to talk to us during the course of this study and for the support and 
advice provided by Bill Sheppard at the Department for Education and 
Science.    
 
Phil Allmendinger, Dean Herd and Gordon MacLeod also worked on the 
project as part of the research team and we would like to thank them for 
their inputs.   The views expressed in this report are those of the authors.   
 
Further information about the project can be obtained from Professor 
Graham Haughton, Department of Geography, University of Hull, Hull 
HU6 7RX. Tel 01482 465006. Email: g.f.haughton@geo.hull.ac.uk 
 
 1.  Introduction 
 
The basic objective is to put in place innovative approaches, based on local partnerships, to 
helping long-term unemployed people improve their employability and move into sustainable 
employment.  We expect the partners working in Employment Zones to do this by: 
• Strengthening strategic and operational partnerships at local level; 
• tackling social issues which form a barrier to employment, through co-ordinating 
and developing local activities; 
• developing an integrated strategy which is accepted by all partners based on the real 
needs of long-term unemployed people; 
• improving value for money by harnessing the range of funds available and using 
them to create effective new forms of provision. 
• creating a flexible approach for participants tailored to individual needs. 
In the light of the performance of the prototypes Ministers will consider whether the Employment 
Zone approach should be extended more widely (Employment Zone Prospectus, September 
1997: 5). 
 
1.1 Study aims  
 
This study is one of a suite of evaluations into the Prototype Employment Zones (PEZs) 
established early in 1998.  PEZs aspired to bring local innovation and flexibility in 
addressing the problems of unemployed people aged over 25 who faced particular 
problems in entering the labour market.  PEZs occupied an important and distinctive 
position within the wider welfare-to-work and social inclusion effort by virtue of the 
strong emphasis which was placed on local partnership working and the development of 
a client-orientated approach.  Couched within an ethos of flexibility and innovation, the 
PEZs in many ways represented the leading edge of experimentation in welfare-to-work.  
The new initiative, marking a break with past practice, was to be concerned with ‘people 
not programmes’, rationalising and ‘joining up’ local provision, blending funding streams 
and streamlining procedures in the interests of clients.   
 
PEZ clients were expected to have been unemployed for at least 12 months, though 
certain categories of people could start from day one of their unemployment.  Clients 
could stay with the zone for a maximum of 12 months.  In addition to having a personal 
adviser, three forms of provision were to be made available to clients, Learning for 
Work, Neighbourhood Match and Business Enterprise (Box 1).  Each client was 
expected to work with their adviser to develop a personally tailored programme, blending 
elements of provision from education, training, work placement or business start-up, as 
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 appropriate.  The zones were initially asked to plan for around 1,000 participants each at 
any one moment in time.   
 
Following a national competitive bidding process amongst eight areas invited to prepare 
proposals, five areas were awarded Prototype Employment Zones.  Only one bid per 
area was allowed, with boundaries for the Zones set out in detail by the Employment 
Service.  As such the competition was between the eight areas invited to prepare PEZ 
bids, but not within the individual areas.  Wide-ranging partnerships were encouraged 
and although the local Employment Service was not allowed to lead, it was expected to 
be an integral member of all the partnerships.  At the end of the competitive bidding 
process, the five successful areas were Glasgow, Plymouth, Liverpool & Sefton, South 
Teesside and North West Wales. 
 
 
Box 1: The Three Required Types of EZ Provision 
 
1.  Learning for Work - the chance to learn and gain qualifications to improve 
employability; 
 
2.  Neighbourhood Match - intermediate labour market (ILM) programmes to 
help people move through supported employment and training to sustainable 
employment in the open labour market; 
 
3.  Business Enterprise - the chance to move from welfare into self-employment 
 
(Employment Zone Prospectus, September 1997: 6) 
 
Local partnerships were encouraged to engage in local searches for flexibility and 
innovation in achieving the transition from welfare to work, whilst acknowledging the 
limits to this imposed by existing legislative limits on pooling different sources of 
government money.  The signature motif of the PEZ approach was to be its emphasis on 
giving individuals a greater variety of means for making the transition from welfare-to-
work, whilst - by giving people a greater sense of ownership and choice over the method 
of transition - improving employability.  To this end, participation on PEZ programmes 
was voluntary and partners were expected to make their provision attractive to 
participants. This would be achieved by including detailed guidance and personalised 
routes into and through appropriate aspects of the available provision.  The use of 
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 personal advisers was central to the PEZ approach from the start, with the same adviser 
expected to stay with a client throughout their time on the zone. 
 
The PEZs were established in February 1998 and started to recruit their first clients in 
April of that year.  They ceased recruiting new clients in August 1999 in preparation for 
their hand over to Fully-Fledged Employment Zones (FFEZs) in April 2000.   
 
This evaluation was commissioned in February 1998, with a two year plus life-span, 
aiming to provide a qualitative and contextual evaluation of the PEZs, complementing 
more quantitative assessment of the progress of PEZs.  Specifically the study was to 
examine the strategic partnerships, operational management and the client-centred nature 
of PEZs.  The research team was asked to address the following questions: 
 
Partnership 
 how are partnerships formed and expertise utilised in local policy development? 
 what is the distinctive expertise that different agencies bring to the partnership? 
 to what extent do PEZ partnerships reflect longer standing patterns of cooperation? 
 why do particular agencies emerge as lead partners? 
 what funding strategies are put in place by partners? 
 how do the Employment Service contribute to the work of the PEZs? 
 
Operational 
 what assessments are made of existing provision? 
 how are data collected and analysed to take forward the development of a more 
coherent approach? 
 how are marketing and communications strategies developed and implemented? 
 how is the effectiveness of modified and new provision evaluated? 
 
Meeting client needs 
 are particular groups among the long-term unemployed targeted in specific ways and 
if so why? 
 how are community needs monitored and identified? 




 1.2 Methodology 
 
An essential feature of the research process was its longitudinal nature, with the research 
team visiting each Employment Zone at four separate points in their development.  The 
original schedule required visits a few weeks after the Zones set up in operation, at their 
mid-point and just before they were to wind-down.  During each of these visits we aimed 
to speak to at least 10 local partners or PEZ workers in each area, whilst also conducting 
a client feedback group in each area.  We were subsequently invited to add an additional 
set of visits to each zone six months into the zones’ lifespans, in which we specifically 
investigated the issue of poor initial up-take of places on the Zones.  For this part of the 
research the interviews were mainly held with PEZ workers plus some key partners, 
whilst in each area a meeting was convened with local unemployed people about any 
potential problems they identified in relation to recruitment on to Employment Zones. 
 
In total we conducted 233 interviews with key stakeholders and PEZ workers and 
undertook 20 focus groups meetings involving 187 people from the local client group.  
The views obtained represent a reasonable overview of the perspectives of the main 
stakeholders in each area.  For the client group, we adopted a random selection 
mechanism. As the PEZ client group is relatively coherent, the sampling method adopted 
fulfils normal requirements for a stratified sample and therefore we can be confident that 
the range and balance of views elicited is representative of PEZ clients. 
 
 
Table 1: Interviews and client numbers in each case study area 
 




Glasgow 41 38 
Liverpool & Sefton 45 28 
NW Wales 45 30 
Plymouth 54 56 
South Tees 48 35 




 1.3 Contextual issues: emerging policy guidance for PEZs 
 
The initial prospectus clearly lays out the rationales for Prototype Employment Zones 
and the ways in which they were expected to operate.  However, as the PEZ experiment 
got under way, central government fine-tuned its advice to the Zones in response to its 
perception of areas of actual or potential weakness which were emerging.  Examples of 
this include the commissioning of a study to examine the management of the PEZs in 
mid-1998, whose conclusions led all the PEZs to tighten up the ways in which 
partnerships operated, clarifying management structures and responsibilities.  In addition, 
slower than anticipated early recruitment led to an increased concern to improve 
recruitment levels from late 1998 onwards.   
 
Perhaps the most important shift in emphasis emerged from late 1998, as the PEZs 
found themselves under increased pressure to produce tangible outputs, in terms of 
clients leaving zones’ provision for positive (employment or education) outcomes.  
Given the slow initial up-take of clients on to the zones, plus the fact that they were 
entitled to spend up to 12 months on PEZ provision, this was seen by some partners as 
premature, as many were not planning for substantial numbers of leavers to emerge until 
mid-late 1999.  This raised one powerful faultline between local and national policy 
expectations of PEZs, where local advisers in particular often felt it appropriate to devise 
12-month action plans for many of the early PEZ recruits in order to improve their long-
term employability.  Alternatively, the policy pressure from above very quickly changed 
this agenda to promoting a more rapid turnaround of clients, many of whom would no 
longer be expected to spend a full 12 months on the PEZ books.  We mention this here 
since this change in policy emphasis created some tensions at the local level, particularly 
during the middle of the study period , which influenced some of our findings. 
 
In order to understand some of the qualitative findings in this study it is also important 
to comment on local reactions to the government’s plans for Fully-Fledged Employment 
Zones, with consultation carried out in early 1999 and a bidding process set in train 
during the summer of 1999.  In comparison with the PEZ approach, these 
announcements reflected substantial shifts in philosophy and practice, inevitably 
colouring stakeholder responses obtained in interviews during this period.  It is fair to say 
that for a short period there was considerable local resentment from the vast majority of 
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 PEZ local partners against government advisers, the ES nationally and DfEE which were 
deemed to have made a ‘rush to judgement’ on the PEZs’ achievements and initial 
weaknesses.   
 
For many partners, personal advisers, PEZ staff and clients, some of the changes 
appeared to contradict the local PEZ experience, particularly the introduction of 
mandatory involvement for clients, the shortening of time for ‘provision’ from a possible 
12 months to six months, and the shift towards a payment-by-results system which 
allowed private-sector firms to run Employment Zones.  In all five areas, local partners 
conceded that there might be contexts where such changes might be valid, but in the 
context of relatively high localised unemployment and a client group consisting of those 
with unemployed for long periods and often with multiple barriers to workforce 
engagement, the changes were often felt to be neither appropriate nor welcome.  Equally 
important, even after the initial adverse local reaction had begun to be replaced with a 
more pragmatic assessment of the need to work with the new arrangements, the Fully 
Fledged proposals provided our respondents with a set of parameters against which to 
judge the relative merits, successes and failures within the PEZ experience.   
 
Since this is a qualitative and contextual evaluation, it is important to bear in mind, 
therefore, that many partners framed their later judgements on PEZ achievements not 
simply against what might have happened had the PEZs not come into existence, but 
also against their perceptions of what the future FFEZ framework might be able to 
deliver.  Since the overwhelming majority of PEZ partners and staff remained convinced 
that the FFEZs constituted a substantially inferior model for welfare-to-work reform, 
this will have undoubtedly influenced some of the responses we received.  This has 
required some sensitivity in analysing the qualitative data, since some of the comments 
made to us as official evaluators clearly aimed to use us to bring to the attention of 
ministers and government officials their displeasure with the fully fledged proposals. 
Indeed, it is possible to argue that some of the very early resistance to the evaluation 
team found in two of the PEZs disappeared when the proposals for fully-fledged zones 
were put out for consultation, as the value of presenting a positive gloss on PEZ 




 It should therefore be recognised at the outset that a qualitative and contextual 
evaluation such as this one is especially sensitive to the opinions and interpretations of 
those PEZ partners, staff and clients on which the research was focused.  While this has 
the strength of yielding real insights into the ‘on the ground’ reception and impact of the 
PEZ initiative, there is also a potential weakness in that the shifting emphases of national 
policy will inevitably shape interpretations of local success and failure.  Inescapably, many 
PEZ partners—after an initial period of enthusiasm and excitement—had, by the mid-
point of the evaluation, concluded that the tide of national policy was turning against 
them.  This triggered some extremely adverse reactions at the local level and clouded the 
evaluation process:  in many areas and amongst many interviewees, a risk-taking, open 
and experimental ethos was displaced by a more defensive and rather instrumentalist 
posture.  However, when our researchers made their final visits a more pragmatic and 
reflective mood had begun to prevail, which we have tried to capture in the present 
report, as the benefits of hindsight allowed the achievements and limits of the PEZ 
approach to be viewed in a rather less emotive light.  The following comment, from a 
PEZ board member who was initially frustrated and angered by the FFEZ proposals, 
captures this changing mood: 
 
There’s no point sitting and crying into our beer about this.  It’s happening, so we’ve just got to 
get on with it.  It would have been very churlish for us to have thrown the towel in and said, ‘we 
didn’t get our way, so we’re not going to play this game any longer’.  At the end of the day, the 
beneficiaries need to be the people getting the employment, not the organisations who feel that a 
good idea has been spurned or whatever.  So that was largely it, a more mature attitude: we’ve 
said our bit let’s get on with it (Voluntary sector board member, round 3). 
 
Yet it would not be to do justice to the opinions of those interviewed, or indeed the 
integrity of the evaluation process itself, if a flavour of these local grievances was not 
conveyed.  A real benefit of the longitudinal approach, in retrospect, is that the full range 
of these views has been captured.  Certainly, lessons have been learned, but for many 
these have been lessons in the possibilities and limits of local governance, rather than 





 2.  Strengthening partnerships 
 
Employment Zones will involve a wide range of partners at local level in developing innovative 
and creative approaches to tackling long-term unemployment (Employment Zone Prospectus, 
September 1997: 4). 
 
2.1 How partnerships were formed and how lead agencies emerged 
 
The geography of the zones played a decisive role in determining how readily 
partnerships formed and became cohesive, coherent policy bodies.  In Glasgow and 
Plymouth, the fact that the zones were coterminous with local authority boundaries 
helped bring about rapid progress on the partnership front.  For Glasgow this was 
assisted by the city’s track record in attempting to develop partnerships, together with its 
role in innovative labour market interventions, particularly in intermediate labour 
markets.  Leadership was taken by the Glasgow Development Agency (the local LEC) 
which also enjoys coterminous boundaries with the City Council.  This appears to have 
been widely accepted as the GDA is seen to be the lead agency for local labour market 
activities and as having a stable financial base.  In contrast, Glasgow City Council was 
still experiencing some internal restructuring as a result of its gaining unitary status after 
the abolition of Strathclyde regional council.  Since the early 1990s Plymouth has also 
enjoyed reasonably harmonious relationships between the public and private sectors, 
helped by its city-wide partnership body, Plymouth 2000, which became the natural host 
body for establishing the local Employment Zone.  In formal terms, the city council took 
the lead for the PEZ, with widespread agreement that this was appropriate since the local 
TEC had a wider regional remit. 
 
In contrast to these two areas, the Employment Zones in Liverpool & Sefton and South 
Teesside did not follow established local government boundaries and partnership 
building was less straightforward.  In Liverpool & Sefton the two local authorities 
assumed the lead amidst general local agreement.  Whilst Objective One funding in 
particular had meant that some partnership working did pre-date the EZ, nonetheless it 
is true to say that initially the PEZ created new and unusual institutional geometries for 
the local authorities, though these appear not to have created any substantive 
impediments to the functioning of the partnership, beyond an initial mutual wariness.  In 
South Teesside, local government reorganisation had seen the abolition of Cleveland 
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 County Council , creating adjustment challenges for the two local authorities which 
overlapped with the Employment Zone.  Consequently the local TEC emerged as the 
natural leader for the PEZ.  Political (and financial support) from local authorities was 
much higher in Liverpool & Sefton than in South Tees, reflecting both the genuine 
enthusiasm with which the PEZ was received on Merseyside and the institutional 
turbulence in South Teesside.  This meant that the early stage of the South Teesside PEZ 
was characterised by significant amounts of management time being spent on internal 
restructuring and dealing with other government initiatives, such as the New Deals. 
Nevertheless, the South Teesside partnership functioned without major tensions and 
played an important role in creating new strategic alliances between some local partners. 
 
North West Wales PEZ was in a category of its own, being constituted of an entirely new 
set of partnership boundaries covering two areas with little history of mutual working of 
this nature.  Moreover, the two parts of the zone confronted quite different labour 
market issues, not least in relation to rural remoteness, seasonal tourism employment and 
the specific employment and training barriers faced in the area with a high proportion of 
Welsh-speaking residents.  Covering the whole of the ES North Wales district and the 
northern part of the ES Coastal district, and intersecting with four county-level local 
authorities, the area lacked coterminosity with any other organisation.  The local TEC, 
CELTEC, had been formed out of a merger of two previous TECs in 1997 and as such 
was itself a relatively new institution.  This led to a series of minor turf disputes over 
leadership of the local welfare-to-work agenda.  As such, no natural leader existed for the 
embryonic PEZ and coordination proved elusive. The Isle of Anglesey council provided 
one of its officers to undertake a coordinating role for the bid.  As partnerships existed 
within parts of the region, the issue here was essentially the need to create new networks 
and partnerships across the newly formed PEZ ‘region’.  From such inauspicious 
beginnings, new networks quickly began to emerge, with a 50-member strategic 
partnership formed to take forward the vision for the PEZ.  Within this group eight 
people emerged as a core group, mainly involving officers from local authorities, 
CELTEC and the two ES offices.  This core group later evolved into the ‘management 
group’ for the zone.   
 
In all five areas, core groups of partners tended to emerge early on, taking the lead both 
in inviting other organisations to join the partnership and in drafting the partnership bid 
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 document (Liverpool & Sefton was slightly unusual in having used a consultant in 
anticipation of the announcement of zones, helping to bring forward its work on this 
document).  Core partners were typically the local authorities, the TEC or LEC, and the 
Employment Service, with others involved as appropriate.  In Glasgow for instance, the 
two long-established ILMs (Wise Group and Glasgow Works) and Community 
Enterprise Strathclyde were also core partners, whilst the Benefits Agency also came to 
be regarded as a central player. On the whole, the partnership ethos was an inclusive one 
across all of the PEZ areas, reflecting a widespread desire to contribute positively to the 
welfare-to-work agenda and to effect change locally. 
  
No major tensions emerged about exclusion or inclusion of key partner bodies.  In each 
area the numbers of partners tended to be substantial, at least 15.  Glasgow had over 20 
partners involved on its management board, whilst South Teesside had 17, plus a wider 
consultative group of 47 additional organisations.  Typically partners would include each 
local authority area and the local TEC or LEC, at least one person each from the private 
sector and the voluntary sector, a trade unionist, and a range of providers, especially 
where these could also claim to be able to in some way represent a particular target group 
among the unemployed.  In some areas, such as Liverpool & Sefton, the private sector 
was only weakly represented in formal and/or practical terms, though this situation 
emerged more by mutual consent rather than exclusion. 
 
2.2 How partnerships evolved 
 
Although there were uneven starting points for partnership development, all the zones 
were characterised early on by an effervescence of goodwill and enthusiasm towards the 
zone concept.  In each area there was also a strong determination to make the zone 
partnerships work in the interest of a client-centred approach.  Much of this motivation 
stemmed from the partners’ belief that the PEZs marked a significant change in the 
government’s approach to unemployment and labour market disadvantage, combined 
with a significant opportunity for experimentation within the new government’s welfare-
to-work agenda.  In particular, partners were galvanised by the emphasis in PEZ 
guidance on encouraging local partners to seek out the possibilities for innovation and 
flexibility in bringing about reform.  As one partner in Liverpool & Sefton noted of the 




 The EZ took that [devolution process] further: here’s a very loose framework; how can you 
help? … The fact that could be determined locally really did engage people.  How often do you 
see a city council take half a million pounds and throw it into an employment project? 
(Liverpool & Sefton, private-sector partner, round 3). 
 
Despite such an abundance of goodwill, or maybe because of it, after a short time some 
dissatisfaction began to emerge, initially nationally and later locally, about whether the 
zones were spending too much time engaged in consultation and consensus building and 
too little time in getting the operational side of the zones moving.  As one of the 
Glasgow partners reflected of the early PEZ board meetings, ‘we probably reached the stage 
where it was an unmanageably large group’ (partner, round 1).   
 
There are still debates among the partners about how severe this problem was, with some 
arguing that the diagnosis was correct, whilst others maintained that they were simply 
following government guidance to think strategically and that the best time to do this was 
early on.  Clearly, though, the operational problems which the PEZs faced in setting up 
their new systems had been dramatically underestimated by both the local partners and 
national government.  In practice, the lack of lead-in time for an experiment with such a 
potentially radical agenda undermined attempts to be innovative, as pressures to address 
performance targets were increased. 
 
 In retrospect we were rather naïve.  We believed the rhetoric about what the Employment Zone 
was meant to be.  It was meant to be local solutions, around the person-centred approach, about 
pooling resources greater integration and all the rest of it and we really went for it.  I think we 
underestimated how much time it does take to reconfigure approaches and all the rest of it and 
get something like that up and running.  I think government completely underestimate that as 
well.  You do not develop those systems which are required to deliver that radically different 
approach overnight.  It takes time (Liverpool & Sefton, local authority, round 2). 
 
With the benefit of hindsight most partners came to acknowledge that the early problems 
of focus and delivery also had a local dimension.  One of the problems which quickly 
emerged for all the PEZs was getting to grips with the large numbers of partners 
involved.  In all zones, early meetings tended to be unfocussed and repetitive, as people 
who missed a previous meeting would interrupt to catch up on business already dealt 
with, memorably leading one partner in Glasgow to say that meetings there began to feel 
like the film Groundhog Day.  In addition, many partners lacked a clear role within the 
partnership or lacked experience of partnership protocols (particularly in relation to 
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 balancing their role as a PEZ partner with their ‘representative’ status for their own 
organisation and client group constituency).  The problems on South Teesside and North 
West Wales reflected a more common set of problems during the early stages of PEZ 
development: 
 
 The zone was drifting.  The whole thing became rudderless, mainly because of the management 
structure.  The sub-groups, and I confess I was part of this, became poorly attended.  The whole 
thing was a bit of a shambles (South Teesside, training provider, round 2). 
 
The whole thing was far too big and not client-led.  Someone said to me that it was like trying to 
run welfare-to-work through a Soviet-style system of planning - you know, having everybody 
round the table trying to have their say and with utter chaos breaking out all around us...  There 
was also the problem of not having a central point of inquiry … we desperately needed a co-
ordinator and a back-up team to do the leg-work (North West Wales, public sector 
partner , round 2).        
 
Prompted by a critical report from a consultancy firm hired by central government, the 
partnerships quickly reviewed their structures and protocols.  The resulting restructurings 
tended to separate out more clearly the roles of executive steering groups (usually 
comprising a group of core local partners), responsible for overseeing operational issues, 
and management groups which took a broader strategic and accountability role.  Two 
PEZs also took this opportunity to change their approach to chairing the partnership.  
Most notably, in Plymouth the initial system of having the chair’s role rotate between key 
partners was abandoned, being deemed to have created a strategic vacuum between 
meetings.  Sub-groups were also rationalised, in order that partners with particular skills 
or interests could become directly involved without having to be part of the PEZ 
steering group. 
 
Towards the end of the lifetimes of all of the zones there emerged a gradual drift away of 
some non-core partners.  This appears to have been stimulated by a range of factors, 
none of them overwhelmingly dominant.  Recurring themes include partners who 
became disaffected following the announcement of the FFEZ proposals and those who 
felt that having set the zones going and with limited operational time left, the main issues 
were procedural rather than strategic and could therefore be left to core partners and the 
executive staff.  It is not surprising perhaps that the area where the PEZ concept was 
perhaps most enthusiastically embraced, Liverpool & Sefton, was the one where the 
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 initial disillusionment and partner fall out was highest in the wake of the announcements 
concerning FFEZs.   
 
 I’m afraid the legs have been chopped from underneath the partnership … A cynicism [has 
returned] that I didn’t sense was around 15-18 months ago, the way this has been handled.  
I’m afraid, it’s taken us back a long time and that’s going to undermine the partnership 
(Liverpool & Sefton, public-sector partner, round 2). 
 
However, in all areas the core partners clearly retained faith in the PEZ initiative and, 
after a few bleak months following the Fully-Fledged proposals, either reconciled 
themselves to the changes, recognising that withdrawal from assisting the unemployed 
could only harm them, or became increasingly determined to see the PEZs through in 
order to prove to the sceptics that, after the full two years of operation, they would be 
recognised as having been successful.  In effect, towards the end of the PEZs’ lifespans, 
while operational business remained much the same, the focus of attention shifted 
elsewhere, especially for the key partners.  In particular, partnership-building and policy-
development energies have been increasingly concentrated elsewhere, beyond the 
immediate remit of Employment Zone policy.  
 
2.3 How partners contributed 
 
What the partners contributed most was the time and expertise of their representatives, 
who all provided their services for free.  In the case of the core partners this was often a 
considerable ‘in time’ contribution, with some partners also providing seconded staff and 
even financial contributions.  In addition, partners brought varying forms of legitimacy 
because of their constituency group, from the elected mandate of local authorities, local 
employer representatives and the community base of voluntary groups.   
 
In broad terms, local authorities brought the professional expertise of staff who frequently 
worked closely with the PEZ staff, plus some degree of legitimacy from their local 
democratic mandate, particularly where councillors became actively involved with PEZ 
boards.  TECs/LECs were often praised for their contribution to the financial 
management of PEZs, and in some cases their financial contributions to PEZ activities.  
Occasional critical comments did emerge from some partners about the alleged outputs-
driven nature of TECs/LECs, which was seen to be driving the PEZs in particular 




The Employment Service contributed much in the way of staff time, particularly providing 
staff to work as personal advisers for PEZ clients.  Local ES staff generated praise for 
their shift to becoming valued local partners, after years of what some interviewees 
characterised as ‘pariah’ status—as the policing arm of what was often seen as a punitive 
benefits regime.  A widespread view encountered in the evaluation was that a far-
reaching ‘culture change’ has indeed begun to take root in ES. 
 
 They have changed their position entirely… I do think they are becoming more entrepreneurial 
and more adventurous – more willing to take risks.  And I think that’s exactly what is needed 
(South Teesside, community sector, round 2). 
 
In turn, local ES staff warmly welcomed the opportunity to work under the PEZ ethos, 
with its promise of a shift from a rules-dominated culture to one where bending the 
system in order to improve client opportunities and encouraging individual 
resourcefulness, flair and inventiveness among advisers were more to the fore.  In 
addition, as a personal adviser with a background in ES commented, ‘The networking with 
local partners, that we’ve never done before.  That’s opened our eyes as to the roles of other organisations 
in the city that we never knew anything about within the ES.  That’s a major change in the last 18 
months’ (Liverpool & Sefton, personal adviser, round 3). 
 
Uniquely, in Glasgow half the personal advisers were provided by the Employment 
Service and half by the network of Local Development Companies (LDCs), which act as 
grassroots regeneration agencies across the city.  The arrangements for the LDC-based 
advisers are interesting for several reasons: several partners argued that as they were 
based in locally-rooted agencies non-ES staff often were better able to appreciate client 
needs and develop a personal rapport (in contrast, several partners argued strongly that it 
was the individual adviser that made the difference, not their organisational background).  
Being locally based, the LDC-based advisers were able to ‘prospect’ for suitable PEZ 
clients within their communities, being paid a ‘bounty’ of £200 per client.  However, as 
this £200 was not enough to cover the costs involved for providing the advisers’ 





 Voluntary and community sector partners contributed most in terms of their knowledge of the 
client group.  All tended to be very supportive of the PEZ approach, particularly its 
voluntary nature for clients.  As such they were prepared to put considerable effort into 
supporting the PEZ at the personal level, though as often poorly-funded organisations 
they tended not to be able to contribute much financially.  In addition, with the voluntary 
and community sector now also expected to make unpaid contributions to a variety of 
other local regeneration initiatives (SRB, the New Deals, European initiatives, and so 
forth) there were limits to the time and energies which could be devoted to PEZ 
activities (some employer body representatives made similar points, arguing that in 
consequence they tended only to maintain a ‘watching brief’).   
 
Amongst some community and voluntary-sector organisations, these concerns have fed 
through into growing suspicion about partnership working in general.  Here, there is a 
sense of ‘partnership fatigue’ in some areas, particularly when over-committed individuals 
are forced to make judgements about which partnerships are most likely to deliver locally 
and which initiatives represent ‘something different’.  As the distinctiveness and future 
potential of the PEZ approach was eroded in the eyes of some partners—more often 
than not, particularly in the voluntary and community sectors—so energy and attention 
was refocused elsewhere. 
 
One recurring theme across the zones was the difficulties faced in galvanising private sector 
support, both as partners and also as sources of potential placements and job openings.  
Clearly, some private-sector people did make valuable individual contributions to the 
work of PEZs.  The more general lack of engagement at partnership level was sometimes 
said to be due to the particular individuals asked to represent the private sector, or 
sometimes due to the lack of incentive for employers to become involved in such 
initiatives (given that with local demand deficit the last thing most faced was recruitment 
problems).  Some private sector representatives also argued it was not their role to create 
jobs and placements but rather to contribute a more general business perspective and 
that expectations other than this were based on unrealistic assumptions about what the 
private sector could bring to the partnerships.  As one employer observed: 
 
 The employers sit on the edge of it all.  Really as employers we haven’t been sure what role we 
should play.  I must admit, for probably six months of the partnership we were thinking ‘what 
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 do they want from us, what do they want us to do?’ (South Teesside, private sector, 
round 2). 
 
Perhaps the final word on the way in which partnerships have emerged differently under 
the PEZ initiative, and something of the disappointment that the Fully-Fledged Zones 
were not going to build from this experience, is best left with the private-sector partner 
who remarked that that the PEZ had been ‘good in partnership building.  Anything that gets 
ES, the business community, the TEC, local authorities or whatever into one room is not bad.  Sadly, 
the benefits [are] not going to benefit EZ; they will benefit other things’ (Liverpool & Sefton, round 
3).  In this respect, the benefits of partnership working around PEZ issues are being 
carried through, though often via other strands of the local welfare-to-work agenda. 
 
2.4 Partnership lessons and achievements 
 
It is probably accurate to summarise this experience to be one where the institutional 
geographies handed down to the PEZs predetermined how quickly the local partnerships 
would gel, from the rapid response in Glasgow and Plymouth to the more tortured early 
experience of North West Wales.  Having said this, much more was gained in terms of 
partnership development in those areas where PEZs created a new institutional 
geography, bringing together new sets of partners in ways which appear to have been 
almost uniformly beneficial.  It is important to recognise in this that partnerships do not 
suddenly emerge as coherent bodies, but take time to develop their knowledge base and 
distinctive sense of purpose.  One of the things which nearly all the partners claim to be 
taking away with them from the PEZ experience is an ability to work productively with a 
much wider range of partners than hitherto.   
 
 The broad aims of the PEZs generated widespread support and enthusiasm amongst 
local partnerships, clients, and PEZ workers. 
 Broad partnership support was achieved for systemic change, despite the fact that in 
many instances this has been disruptive of local organisational practice and 
established policy ‘turfs’. 
 Evidence in all partnerships of an emerging capacity to think flexibly and collectively, 
share knowledge, and recognise the various strategic and operational capabilities of 
those involved in the Zones. 
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  Supportive and flexible approach on the part of ES locally; ES has become 
increasingly bound in to a local partnership approach in both strategic and 
operational terms. Partners tend to acknowledge ES as working with the community 
rather than simply in it. 
 Central direction from DfEE proved helpful in directing PEZs towards a more 
focused approach. Whilst this top-down approach did cause some resentment, in 
many cases a mixture of pragmatism and reflection led to an acceptance of the need 
for change. Better communications could have helped avoid some local tensions. 
 Real—as opposed to nominal—support of local partners and organisations takes 
time to build, but can evaporate quickly. 
 Partnership working requires the effective separation of strategy from day-to-day 
operational issues. 
 Some alienation developed amongst key partners following changes in Employment 
Zones policy; a widespread feeling among partners was that the PEZs were ‘blighted’ 
by shifting national priorities.  If ‘bottom-up’ policy development is to occur, there is 
a pressing need to improve lines of communication, and dialogue, between national 
policy-makers and local partners. 
 Tensions and misunderstandings did occasionally emerge amongst partnership 
organisations, particularly in terms of the ES role during the bidding process for 
FFEZs.  By contrast, the perception of local partners being unfairly treated by central 
government helped to bring partners together more strongly at the local level. 
 Involvement of non-core partners tended to be limited by the nature of the 
partnership and by their lack of available time and unclear roles. 
 Changes in national operating frameworks may have impeded continuity and long-
term planning, at the same time as helping improve focus on achieving key 




 3.  Managing the PEZ process 
 
The success of Employment Zones will be closely monitored.  Indicators such as the number of 
participants who joint Employment Zones, the popularity of and numbers of participants on 
each of the three core elements and the effect on participants’ employability shall be evaluated to 
determine the overall success of Employment Zones (Employment Zone Prospectus, 
September 1997: 20). 
 
3.1 Assessing and accessing local provision 
 
From the outset it was intended that PEZs should, where feasible and appropriate, use 
existing provision in order to avoid duplication.  A consequence of following this 
guidance is that duplication appears not to have been an issue for any of the PEZs, 
though as some respondents did point out there is sometimes a fine line between what is 
deemed by some ‘useful competition’ and by others ‘counterproductive duplication’.  For 
much of the larger scale provision of training in particular, initial assessment of capacity 
and quality was possible because providers were already contracted to the local 
TECs/LEC.   
 
Many partners were already very familiar with the nature of local provision prior to PEZ.  
Few, it must also be said, were satisfied with the overall quality and breadth of this 
provision.  The strictly circumscribed ability to develop new provision under the PEZ 
regime was regarded as a significant shortcoming by some PEZ partners, though others 
stressed that the scope to shape advice, placement and referral systems afforded an 
opportunity to shift the balance and quality of local provision ‘through the market’.  In 
the final outcome, this latter area was where many of the PEZs concentrated their 
efforts. 
 
The important point to highlight here is that PEZs were often most clearly able to 
pursue their mandate of local flexibility and innovation by way of new and/or 
unconventional routings through the pre-existing repertoire of education, training, and 
work placements.  Particularly memorable was the client who told us how he had been 
on numerous government ‘schemes’ over the years, gradually building up his formal 
qualifications - but his gripe was that under previous schemes every time he wanted to 
achieve the next stage of qualification he would be first forced to pursue the levels which 
he had already taken.  With PEZ, he had the ability to step off this bureaucratic treadmill 
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 and consequently require trainers to meet his precise personal needs.  This, he explained, 
was the power of choice.  Precisely because he was not required to do the course under a 
mandatory scheme, he could actually get the training he wanted when he wanted, rather 
than endure months of futile repetition.  During the study many different clients and 
partners contrasted the ‘sausage machine’ approach of the standard government scheme 
for the unemployed over previous years, with the more tailored provision available under 
PEZ.  The courses may have been mainstream and standardised, but the routeways 
through could be personalised.   
 
Such stories highlighted graphically how valuable the advice was in the PEZ prospectus 
that a key requirement would be for PEZs to be able to prove to clients the excellence of 
the options available.  Only when the client has the ability to say no to sub-standard 
and/or inappropriate provision can they truly be said to be empowered.  With PEZ they 
had that power and the benefits were clear in all our meetings with clients, who often 
commented on their appreciation of the greater sense of control over their job 
preparation activities.  More than this, however, was the way in which empowering 
clients led to them taking a much more active role in identifying and accessing 
appropriate forms of provision.  As one adviser readily admitted, much of the innovation 
within PEZs came from the clients themselves, not the partnerships or the advisers: 
 
 The whole ethos of EZ has been self-selection and the reason we’ve had such imaginative ideas 
about how to get people back to work is that we haven’t thought of them, the personal advisers 
haven’t thought of them, the people on the dole have (Liverpool & Sefton, public-sector 
partner, round 3). 
 
The counter argument is that giving clients this power over their job preparation 
activities can lead to abuse of the system - for instance, people setting themselves 
inappropriate goals and undertaking training or education solely because it was relatively 
interesting or easy, rather than because it was useful and challenging in terms of 
improving personal employability.  This is one area where, in retrospect, some partners 
felt that personal advisers had tended not to push clients hard enough towards 
employability outcomes in the early months of the PEZs.  However, to the extent that 
such accusations had some early validity, such was the learning experience of the advisers 
and the pressures from central government, that after a year any such naiveté had been 
firmly replaced by more focused attempts to persuade clients to be realistic in terms of 
their aspirations and what they needed to do to make themselves job ready.  Clearly, 
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 however, a balance of some kind has to be struck between such an instrumentalist, job-
orientated focus, driven mainly by system imperatives, and the wider objective of client 
empowerment through choice.  Although many clients would indeed choose the shortest 
route to work, others were more concerned to find the most appropriate pathway to a 
sustainable job.  Indeed, a familiar theme in our client meetings was that most ‘quick fix’ 
methods had already been tried (many times) by this client group, and what they wanted 
from PEZ was ‘something different’—in terms of support to take a more appropriate 
path into work. 
 
By casting the partnership net so wide there seems to have been a strong awareness of 
existing local provision in each area, sometimes assisted by detailed local studies as part 
of putting together the initial PEZ bidding document.  This said, not all personal advisers 
could have been expected to be aware of every single aspect of provision in their locality, 
creating some potential for unevenness in advice provided.  This was particularly true of 
non-conventional or non-‘scheme’ routes for unemployed people.  A widespread 
example of the wider horizons to accessing training provision evident within PEZs was 
the support given to passing driving tests for cars, passenger and heavy goods vehicles, 
where these would help improve employability (one example was a joiner who wanted to 
become self-employed but needed a car to transport his tools and widen his market area).  
Other examples include a person who just needed to top up his diving certificates to 
guarantee a job and numerous cases of people wishing to become driving instructors.  
The important point to be made here is that PEZ advisers used their local flexibility to 
access a much wider range of options than had been available to them under previous 
‘schemes’ for the unemployed.   
 
Where existing provision tended to exist in the training and business start-up areas, the 
pre-existing provision of Intermediate Labour Market options was very limited, except in 
the case of Glasgow.  In Glasgow the approach was to use the existing providers and 
extend or tailor provision as appropriate, whilst providing more detailed support services 
for clients entering through the Employment Zone.  Elsewhere considerable effort had 
to be undertaken to identify possible areas for ILM activity and to initiate projects in 
these areas.  As we report below, for some partners considerable doubts emerged about 
the money and time spent on developing this area of activity.  Where provision was 
effectively starting de novo the experience is that it took an inordinate amount of time 
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 and effort on the part of partners and providers.  In other cases, however, ILM 
development was viewed as one of the PEZs’ enduring achievements.  Local partners in 
areas like Liverpool & Sefton were especially keen to capitalise on the development work 
which had been invested in ILM programmes through PEZ.  These would become a 
continuing feature of local provision in such areas. 
 
3.2 Monitoring and evaluation 
 
Monitoring and evaluation emerged as important themes in this study, following early 
complaints about the excessive bureaucracy associated with the zones and debates which 
emerged about how and when it was most appropriate to judge the lessons coming from 
the PEZs. 
 
In terms of monitoring, in the early days of the zones the apparently excessive and 
duplicative process of form-filling in order to allow clients to move on to PEZ provision 
attracted considerable criticism from partners and more particularly from personal 
advisers and clients.  Responding to these criticisms, the Employment Service 
subsequently streamlined and computerised the process which, though not 
unproblematic, reduced the number of complaints.   
 
The significance of this set of concerns, however, ran rather deeper than simply excessive 
form filling.  There was genuine concern that the problems were symptomatic of a gap 
between local partners and central government funding bodies, where local partnerships 
aimed for flexibility whilst central government imposed restrictive and seemingly 
inflexible procedures from above.  Moreover, some people argued that excessive 
bureaucracy might help explain why employers had been slow to get involved with the 
PEZs, especially small companies, leading one person to argue that: ‘If a small business took 
on a few Employment Zone people most of the time would be taken on paperwork’ (South Teesside, 
community sector, round 2).  Here, the much-vaunted flexibility of PEZs was seen to 
come at a price:  systems were being blended and reorganised but the bureaucratic 
procedures were not and straddling different delivery and funding regimes often led to a 
multiplication of demands and complexity.  PEZ staff and personal advisers, in 
particular, complained that the time-consuming nature of this process did not seem to be 




One of the shortcomings across the zones until well into their second year was the 
paucity of their work in terms of structured client feedback and the monitoring of the 
success of different forms of provision.  Whilst some of this is linked to the slow 
development of an effective national monitoring system, for most of the time the zones 
monitored provision through informal client feedback to advisers and providers.  This 
procedure provided, at best, anecdotal views about how well different projects had 
performed and for some partners the lack of substantive data hindered their ability to 
make strategic decisions.  Some PEZ boards, however, made creative use of client ‘case 
studies’ in assessing advice and referral systems and in exploring areas for further 
improvement in PEZ systems. 
 
Higher level evaluation elicited some of the most critical comments from our 
respondents.  In particular, partners frequently commented on how their perception that 
changes in central government advice and the announcements surrounding FFEZs were 
being taken without appropriate evaluation having been undertaken.  Most significantly, 
the argument from several partners and PEZ employees was that, not only was the PEZ 
experiment itself too short to achieve the radical aims that had been set, but that 
decisions on which parts of the zones’ activities had been unsuccessful or successful were 
made far too early to allow for any learning process and adjustment to take place during 
their lifetimes.  Several respondents felt that shifts in national policy had seemed to be 
occurring in ways that were almost impervious to the on-the-ground experience of PEZs.  
On occasions, this bred frustration and even cynicism about the direction of 
Employment Zone policy and the scope for locally-formulated policy innovation.  As 
one person forcefully put it  
 
 We have learnt that Government has got a degree of impatience and they’re not prepared to see 
what works.  They designed the Fully-Fledged before we’d fully evaluated and implemented the 
Prototype.  Now on what basis did that suddenly emerge? We’ve set up an experiment for two 
years, two-thirds of the way through it we’re going to have another experiment before we’re able 
to see clearly whether that experiment has actually worked! (Liverpool & Sefton, public-
sector partner, round 3). 
 
Most respondents were sufficiently worldly as to have experienced major shifts in policy 
direction before.  Where, however, the PEZ initiative was different, if not unique, was in 
the explicit nature of its experimental method and learning ethos.  In this context, not 
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 only was policy learning expected to occur, it was one of the primary aims of the 
initiative and had to be seen to occur.  An extremely widespread perception amongst local 
partners was that decisions were repeatedly, and indeed increasingly through the lifetime 
of the initiative, being taken ‘above the heads’ of the zones.  Whether fully warranted or 
not, this must be a source of concern.  Indeed, at the local level, the very presence of 
such perceptions tended to erode the credibility of the evaluation and policy 
development process and, by implication, that of the FFEZ proposals.  It created a 
degree of awkwardness in the conduct of this research project, as individuals interviewed 
three or perhaps four times in the course of a two-year evaluation expressed a growing 
sense of exasperation that—for one reason or another—the messages did not seem to be 
getting through to national policy-makers. 
 
3.3 Marketing and communication 
 
One of the areas where PEZs encountered criticism was in their early approaches to 
marketing and communication.  The general consensus is that the zones were initially 
slow in developing their work in this area.  Partly this reflected other priorities taking 
precedence.  In some instances a lack of marketing activity reflected a deliberate decision 
by partners not to ‘over-sell’ the zones, for fear of generating a demand which they did 
not have the funding to meet.  However, the problems seemed to have been more deep-
seated than inattention to marketing.  When we examined the responses for slow early 
recruitment on to the zones it became clear that a number of inter-related problems 
existed, including a lack of clarity about whether EZ referrals could be counted towards 
ES staff targets and in some cases slow recruitment of core staff and personal advisers.  
In addition, some ES advisers less directly involved with the zones were unclear at first 
about their role and remit, which as one of them told us, led to a reluctance to refer some 
clients on to the zones: 
 
 At first there was a little bit of reluctance … We knew that these people had huge barriers, and 
there was a sense that we had to try to help them ourselves, rather than palming them off on to 
EZs.  But then we realised that that was not the way to go, and that different packages can be 
put together to help the client...  But I do think, certainly in my office, there was initially a 
reluctance to pass on to the EZ advisers some of the … more difficult clients  (Plymouth, 




 Once the issue of slow early recruitment of clients was highlighted by central government 
as a particular area of concern, increased effort was paid to marketing, with some zones 
producing locally-tailored brochures for distribution and in at least one case, a video 
highlighting examples of clients who had benefited from joining a zone.  In addition, the 
zones came to realise that they would need to engage in more work in bringing the zones 
to the attention of potential employers as participants came closer to job readiness.  One 
consequence of the poor marketing of PEZs was in creating a distinctive message which 
would enable employers to distinguish them from New Deal activities.  As one 
respondent told us, ‘As far as employers are concerned, it’s a bit of a free-for-all’ (South Teesside, 
quasi-public sector partner, round 2).  Improving employer awareness proved 
problematic, however, both because of confusion among some employers about the 
difference between competing government initiatives in this area and the amount of 
work it would have required from EZ staff.  In North West Wales for instance, the 
economy is very much based on small firms, creating quite serious challenges for 
communication and marketing.   
 
The other area where communication was central to the PEZs was in working with 
clients.  At one level, the much closer relationship with personal advisers provided a 
useful avenue for mutual exchange of information, for clients about EZ entitlements and 
activities and for advisers about client perceptions.  Nonetheless, in our focus groups we 
frequently found people identified to us as EZ clients who came to the meetings not 
really sure what their own status was.  Sometimes, it was only talking during the meeting 
to our participants that they became fully aware that they were on EZ provision and what 
this might mean for them.  Indeed one of the main benefits of these meetings for clients 
was in exchanging information and knowledge with one another.  Given the individually 
tailored nature of routes through EZ provision, it does seem as if some clients 
inadvertently appear to have been left without access to a peer group.   
 
Clients generally felt that they were able to respond to any problems which they 
encountered, usually citing either their adviser or the person responsible for the particular 
aspect of provision they were engaged with.  Interestingly enough, the fact of their 
voluntary participation was seen as central as a bargaining tool in helping them resolve 
problems - clients felt genuinely empowered to influence not only their choice of 
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 provision but also to comment on the value of the provision to them.  If necessary, they 
would vote with their feet and move off inappropriate or poor quality projects.   
 
Overall, marketing was not a particular success story for the PEZs, though partnership 
level communications between different players in the labour market was a different 
matter.  Here, there seems to have been a real and generalised improvement in 
communications and, more importantly, mutual understanding.  As one PEZ personal 
adviser observed, ‘With Employment Zones the personal links are much closer.  Previously there was 
little communication at all.  EZs mean that we have closer links with the providers, businesses, and the 
unemployed’ (North West Wales, round 3). 
 
3.4 Funding strategies 
 
The bulk of funding from PEZ activities was indirect, consisting of accessing existing 
government-paid provision for the unemployed.  Specific monies for PEZ activity 
tended to be quite small, averaging at about £1-2m per zone. This could be used for 
activities such as the core management functions of the PEZ and also for identifying and 
filling specific gaps in provision or addressing particular labour market barriers.   
 
But in general, one of the areas where PEZs failed to make as much progress as they had 
hoped was in bringing together different funding regimes. 
 
 The idea of drawing together other funding looks easy.  You can say it in a sentence… That’s a 
very, very difficult thing to do.  We’ve all got different outputs and targets and rules and 
regulations and things we’ve got to do with our funding … And to do it takes time and 
trust…you need years; you don’t need 18 months (Liverpool & Sefton, public-sector 
officer, round 2). 
 
For some partners the relative lack of progress on this front reflect the lack of support 
they got elsewhere, not least in their funding submissions.  For instance in two zones, 
failed applications for European Social Fund schemes submitted by the PEZs were felt 
to have held back some of their work.  Whilst some partners were willing to accept this 
might have been due to poor quality submissions, others argued that a stronger role from 
Government Offices for the Regions might have helped them overcome such obstacles 
and helped in the broader goal of ‘joined up’ policy development within government.  
This connects with the findings of a DETR study into the coordination of area-based 
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 regeneration initiatives, which found links between different bidding programmes also 
tended to be under-developed, with Employment Zones highlighted as particularly 
problematic in this respect (DETR 2000). 
 
The main benefit flexibility which became incorporated into the Zones was the ability to 
pool averaged-out unemployment benefits of £75 a week per head into ILMs, in order to 
support work placements.  However a widespread concern among partners was that they 
had been unable to explore fully the potential for local benefits flexibilities because of a 
failure of both local and central government departments to allow greater flexibility, for 
instance concerning housing benefits.  A particular grievance was that after asking each 
partnership to submit projects to explore benefit flexibilities, a process known as 
Permission to Pilot, very few were actually allowed to be taken forward in a positive way. 
This ‘flexibility denied’ narrative was a powerful one among many partners, across all 
sectors.   
 
 Giving an honest view, I still don’t think the promise of EZs has been realised […] you’re told 
to be innovative – you’re told to think the unthinkable – you’re told to change things to make a 
difference – but at the same time you’re told you’ve got to do all this in a 2-year timescale and 
you’ve got to meet targets or you don’t get your dosh.  Those two things don’t sit well (South 
Teesside, public sector partner, round 2). 
 
While this is a powerful argument, the real significance of ‘flexibility denied’ is extremely 
difficult to assess. Some local partners may have been exaggerating the size of the 
‘flexibility dividend’—to be yielded from streamlined benefit procedures, for example—
in PEZ performance. Shifting national policy parameters meant that the potential role of 
benefit flexibilities could not be quantified, yet as a signifier of restricted local discretion 
and truncated scope for experimentation this has acquired a powerful resonance with 
many local partners.  Somewhat conveniently, of course, ‘flexibility denied’ is a message 
which allows shortfalls in local PEZ performance to be explained away by reference to 
external constraints.  In reality, of course, the truth is lies between these polar positions, 
but the politicised nature of this question means that conclusive answers are likely to 
remain elusive.  
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 3.5 Managing the zones 
 
There are a number of other PEZ management issues which merit mention and which 
we include here.  Many of these relate to the initial bid documents, which had to be put 
together to a very tight time scale.   
 
One set of inter-related issues which came up in all the zones was that in putting together 
their bidding documents the prospective PEZ partners seriously under-estimated the 
time and energy it would take to become operationally effective.  This said, there are 
different views among partners about whether the slow start in work on the PEZs was 
strategic and valuable, or simply a mark of over-optimism and even naïveté. The 
conflicting interpretations of two partners in Liverpool give a sense of the polarized 
views which emerged 
 
 Slow start.  Deliberate slow start.  We wanted it slow because we wanted to avoid going in with 
the big bang approach that has failed so often in the past.  So we wanted to learn as we went 
along and we felt that we did.  As it bedded down, more money became available through 
matchability of European funds, and the whole thing gathered pace (Liverpool & Sefton, 
public-sector partner, round 3). 
 
 We screwed up on the lead-in time.  I think every zone did because we thought we could do it 
from straight off and all we were doing was patching together some old stuff in different ways.  
We had all the parts.  That still took us an additional four months to get running properly.  
Goodness knows what it’s going to be like [for the FFEZ] (Liverpool & Sefton, private-
sector partner, round 3). 
 
The need to appoint and train staff were central issues here.  A key message to emerge 
from Plymouth was that early appointment of core staff was essential.  Delays in 
appointing a zone manager were widely held to have contributed to some of the initial 
problems of the PEZ, including slow recruitment.  Similarly, delays in appointing a full 
team of advisers hindered recruitment of clients and burdened those already in post.  
Compounding this problem in some ways, the response of some zones to early capacity 
constraints was to delay or dilute marketing plans so as not to over-burden the system.   
 
After experiencing teething problems a number of zones put considerable effort into 
providing networking and development opportunities for advisers.  Some zones also 
found it useful to help focus partners’ work by holding ‘away day’ style events to work on 
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 strategies and approaches as a means of developing awareness and ownership of zone 
policies.   
 
Another widely acknowledged failing was in setting overly ambitious targets in the initial 
bidding documents. Such over-ambitious targets resulted in all the zones at one stage or 
another re-negotiating their contracts to reflect a more realistic assessment of possible 
recruitment.  Whilst some of these downward revisions reflected the fact that with 
declining numbers unemployed the client group had itself diminished in size, many core 
partners in the zones also acknowledged (with the benefit of hindsight) to having set 
over-optimistic targets in an attempt to ensure the success of their bid.  This propensity 
of competitive bidding processes to induce ‘target inflation’ needs to be borne in mind in 
future initiatives, because as the PEZ experience shows a ‘false start’ in this respect can 
be very damaging.  In the PEZ case, many partners and officers felt that it led to the 
initiative’s premature branding as a ‘failure’. 
 
Finally, returning to a theme already well-rehearsed here, some partners felt that central 
government had been overly prescriptive in guiding PEZs towards improving their 
outcomes performance.  In essence, the argument tended to be that there is an inevitable 
balancing act between risk and innovation.  Some partners felt that successive 
government announcements were effectively intended to ‘punish’ the PEZs.  This was in 
turn seen as a way of prescribing the limits of innovation, since any activities which did 
not yield quick results in terms of job outcomes came to be seen as politically risky, 
meaning that work with the most socially-excluded parts of the client group in turn 
became in this sense ‘risky’.    
 
 There is this view that prototypes haven’t achieved their objectives.  That reflects a lack of 
understanding how difficult it was to get this off the ground and to be different.  You cannot set 
up ILM overnight.  You really cannot.  Secondly, delivery plans were predicated on the 
assumption that [the EZ would be] allowed to do things differently, but the reality is I can’t 
think of a single thing that’s been allowed to be done differently … All of that impacted on the 
delivery plan.  We had to deliver within the traditional statutory constraints (Liverpool & 
Sefton, public-sector officer, round 3). 
 
Such concerns stoked a cumulative sense of grievance amongst some partners and led to 
a degree of disengagement on the part of others. Those who adopted a more pragmatic 
and instrumental line—a small group of partners initially but perhaps the majority by the 
end—did so in the knowledge that the PEZs probably lacked the time or resources to 
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 ‘perform their way out’ of this dilemma.  Either way, the long-run future for the PEZ 
initiative seemed clearly to be limited and these short time horizons sapped both the 
desire and the practical scope for innovation and risk-taking in the second half of the 
PEZs’ operational existence. 
 
3.6 Management lessons and achievements 
 
Those responsible for running the Prototype Employment Zones and many personal 
advisers displayed a very high level of commitment and enthusiasm to the goals and 
aspirations of the zones.  This was noted not only by the workers themselves, but also by 
partners and clients.  Virtually without exception, those running the PEZs felt that it 
provided them with the ability to make a useful contribution to the lives of their clients 
in a positive environment.  This was frequently contrasted with the so-called  ‘sausage 
machine’ approach of previous government training programmes for the unemployed 
which many said they had previously been involved with operating or policing.   
 
There was a genuine feeling amongst those responsible for the PEZs that they were 
pioneers and also ambassadors for a distinctive approach within the government’s 
welfare-to-work agenda.  Perhaps not surprisingly, given this level of commitment, 
initially they tended to respond poorly to external criticisms, whether direct or implied.  
Whilst laudable in one sense, the fact that after a period of time the criticisms were often 
acknowledged as being valid in some respects, and then acted upon, draws attention to a 
potential flaw in the PEZ approach.  So enamoured were workers with the value of their 
day-to-day activities that sometimes they failed to be sufficiently self-critical and strategic, 
and  tended to blame external factors for many of the problems they encountered. 
 
Although this may be understandable in the context of the rapid changes which the 
zones were trying to bring about on the ground, it nonetheless remains an important 
lesson.  The crusading zeal of the early PEZ development phase was very effective in 
galvanising the support of partners and building the case for systemic reform, but it may 
also have led to a certain lack of critical self-awareness amongst the PEZs.  Located, it 
seemed, in the vanguard of the welfare-to-work policy development process, the PEZs 
perhaps did not expect to be subject to criticism at the very beginning of their operational 
lives.  Failing to anticipate the degree of political impatience and bureaucratic urgency in 
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 the welfare-to-work agenda, the PEZ partners genuinely believed that the experiment 
would run its full course before being assessed.  Hence their surprise at the harsh implied 
judgement embodied in the FFEZ proposals. 
 
What this section has begun to highlight are the different narratives of success and failure 
among partners.  Some condemned changes to the PEZs, maintaining that with more 
patience on the part of national policy-makers, the benefits of the PEZ initiative would 
have spoken for themselves—in other words that the basis of a successful system had 
been put in place, but just needed more time to prove itself.  Others, however, continue 
to insist that ‘flexibility denied’ is a key element of the story—or that local initiative has 
been repeatedly stifled by limitations in the national operating environment.  Neither 
version has an adequate explanatory capacity: the PEZ initiative was a complex interplay 
of local and central responses to perceived short-comings in the early days of their 
operations, which led to the creation of new operational imperatives and some 
questioning of the roles of local initiative and local policy development in welfare-to-
work.  One consequence of this rapidly iterating policy environment was that a stable and 
consistent ‘picture’ of the PEZ experiment was never given the time to emerge.  National 
and local policy-makers seemed to be looking down different ends of the same telescope, 
and rarely saw the same image. 
 
 The PEZ remit was an ambitious one, which took longer than expected to realise; 
many partners argued strongly that their critics had failed to judge them over the 
whole of their lifespan. 
 A perceived failure to emphasise marketing and publicity, both to clients and to 
employers, or to pitch it at the right level, was noted.   
 Excessive bureaucracy impeded the work of advisers in particular for the first few 
months. To its credit, the ES nationally responded quickly to complaints, introducing 
a computerised system which helped streamline the process. 
 Systemic change at the local level requires a relatively long policy horizon and secure 
funding streams; uncertainty saps innovatory potential, while long-term objectives are 
not always compatible with short-term targets. 
 It is difficult conclusively to separate out the relative effects of participation rules, 
programme design, the personal adviser system, labour market conditions, etc. in 
what proved to be a short-term, multi-dimensional initiative. 
  
30 
  There was a tendency amongst PEZ partners and workers to highlight external 
causes for programme under-performance (‘flexibility denied’), when this may be just 
one of the factors at work. Following on from this, adverse local reactions to central 
government direction were sometimes initially over-sensitive. 
 A preoccupation with balancing the books as PEZs came to an end threatened to 
undermine their broader ethos. 
 The client-centred ‘employability’ approach takes a considerable amount of time to 
become embedded within the organisational culture of those dealing with the 
unemployed. 
 Innovation restricted by a lack of creativity and/or expertise in the partnership, a 
tendency to ‘play it safe’, particularly once meeting targets was forced up the PEZ 
agenda. 
 Whilst community outreach was effective in some zones, notably Glasgow, in others 
it was relatively weak, whilst employer outreach work was generally under-developed, 
reflecting the fact that funding had not been ear-marked for this work. 
 Complex, multi-dimensional initiatives like the PEZ are difficult to evaluate 
conclusively, at least in the short term; policy messages are therefore never simple 




 4.  Meeting client needs 
 
At the heart of the Employment Zone concept is a commitment to give individuals a wider choice 
of paths out of unemployment.  Individuals will be given a sense of ownership and choice which 
will help them improve their own employability (Employment Zone Prospectus, September 
1997: 4). 
 
4.1 Targeting clients 
 
The main client group for the PEZs consisted of people unemployed for over 12 
months.  However, it was possible to join an EZ immediately on becoming unemployed 
for those with disabilities, those requiring help with basic literacy, numeracy and spoken 
English (Welsh for those in Wales), returners to the labour market, lone parents, ex-
offenders, and those affected by large-scale redundancies.  In addition, the government’s 
guidance to PEZs stressed their role in addressing social exclusion and assisting those 
people most vulnerable in the job market.  Building from this guidance, some PEZs 
identified particular ‘target’ sub-groups: a target of 15% of clients aged over 45 in 
Plymouth, whilst in Glasgow specific targets included 15% of clients being lone parents, 
10% aged over 45, 10% with disabilities or major health problems, and 60% unemployed 
for over two years.  Alternatively, in South Tees no specific target groups were identified, 
with a preference for taking on all who were eligible.  Similarly in Liverpool & Sefton, 
initially there was a view that all eligible clients should be targeted, though subsequently a 
more targeted approach emerged which focused on job-readiness, in order to achieve 
targets on job outcomes. 
  
Particularly in the early months, most PEZ workers seemed to relish the challenge of 
identifying and tackling those within the client group with the greatest problems, 
particularly those unemployed for very long periods.  This in some ways made the task of 
the zones harder, since in choosing to focus on some of the most socially-excluded parts 
of the caseload meant that many clients were going to require a long period of assistance 
and/or intensive support.  Indeed, even with the full 12 months of provision, some 
might not become job-ready.  But it was a powerful part of the PEZ ethos in their early 
days not to ‘cream’ off the most job-ready clients in order to reduce costs.  And to be 
fair, even after the zones had acknowledged and acted on external pressures to produce 
more rapid outcomes (that is moving clients more quickly from JSA into work), the 
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 prevailing view of partners and workers is that they resisted overt creaming and 
maintained some of their outreach work.  This said, inevitably, a shift in emphasis did 
emerge over time, creating real dilemmas and frictions:  
 
 We’ve already got a lot of the hardest-to-help on the books so its going to be really hard for us to 
change in line with the new philosophy and get people into jobs … [Output targets mean] that 
we are telling advisers to get people who will take the absolute minimum time to get into work, 
which means we are now directly competing with the New Deal 25+ (Plymouth, 
Employment Zone employee, round 2). 
 
 What we’ve got emerging in our client group is the danger of the cream of the crop getting 
creamed off.  In our case we’ve estimated that up to a third of our client group may be people 
with an offending record of some kind, which makes it even more difficult to get these people 
placed.  The temptation of the EZ is to push them to the back, park them and get on with the 
two-thirds you can get paid for.  Where’s the incentive? I can’t see that the system of reward is 
set up in such a way that we can genuinely focus on equal opportunity issues, and that worries 
me (Plymouth, public sector, round 3). 
 
With the benefit of hindsight, external pressure to improve the focus on job outcomes 
was seen as inevitable and to a degree welcome.  As one adviser succinctly put it: 
 
 Initially, when EZ was set up it was very much ‘whatever the client wants was what the client 
gets’, so that if they wanted to be a brain surgeon but there was no demand, you still allowed 
them to be a brain surgeon.  But, certainly, since Christmas the policy has changed, so that it 
must be realistic and they must have the capabilities of being able to do it, and it must be linked 
directly to what the labour market needs.  The focus in terms of it being a job-drive initiative has 
become very clear.  (South Teesside, PEZ worker, round 3). 
 
A fairly widely accepted position now is that early on PEZ advisers had too often 
assumed that a full 12 months’ entitlement was the norm for most clients, and focused 
on devising 12-month programmes to improve employability.  Alternatively, the pressure 
for rapid outcomes created a danger of insensitivity to the problems of the most severely 
disadvantaged in the labour market, leaving them to slide down the list of PEZ priorities.  
In the event, a position somewhere between the two extremes emerged, as PEZs sought 
to encourage those clients closest to job-readiness through the system more rapidly, 
whilst remaining sensitive to the need for longer durations of assistance for those most in 
need.   
 
Especially valuable was the pioneering outreach work of some of the PEZs in tackling 
client groups usually ignored by government initiatives for the unemployed.  For instance 
in Glasgow, some community-based outreach workers developed interventions with 
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 people in prisons about to be released and become unemployed ex-offenders.  Similarly 
in North West Wales, the zone is particularly proud of its work in assisting individuals 
with a history of mental health problems.  Tackling social exclusion in these ways, 
attempting to intervene before problems become so entrenched that they become even 
more difficult to address, needs to be seen as one of the key achievements of the PEZs.  
Whilst such experience will not be directly replicable under the FFEZs, which do not 
have the same flexibility in addressing the needs of special case exemptions from day one 
of unemployment, nonetheless, some lessons can be learnt for other initiatives working 
with the socially excluded. 
 
4.2 Identifying client needs 
 
At the labour market level, client needs were largely identified in the original PEZ bid 
documents, compiled using a combination of secondary labour market information plus 
inputs from specific research, often undertaken by partners.   
 
At the level of the individual, assessment of client needs was essentially undertaken 
through early work between clients and personal advisers.  This usually involved a series 
of interviews between the advisers and clients as they attempted to identify clients’ 
existing work-related skills and experiences, any labour market problems, job aspirations 
and from this the ways in which personalised route ways could be constructed through 
the available mixture of PEZ provision.  For some clients, fairly simple routes through 
just one form of provision might have been all that was required.  For others, complex 
trajectories might be called for, starting with work on numeracy and literacy, or basic 
skills training, then moving through to more advanced training, and subsequently on to a 
job placement, perhaps in an ILM.  Personal advisers, dissatisfied with the traditional 
one-size-fits-all approach, would often make the maximum use of such flexibilities.  
Clients, too, responded positively to such ‘tailored’ approaches. 
 
4.3 Caseload management and personal advisers 
 
One of the stand-out successes of the PEZ experience has been the role of personal 
advisers.  Both clients and partners were emphatic that personal advisers had become 
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 more sensitive to client-needs, and indeed were central to the evolution of a more client-
centred approach.  As two clients explained, 
 
Under Restart, there was too much pressure and they just pushed me around.  Under Employment 
Zones the advisers are in touch with us and they seem interested in us as people (North West 
Wales, client, round 2).     
 
[The personal adviser]  said there’s this and there’s that, and instead of saying ‘this would be best 
for you’, she said, ‘What do you want to do?’… It gives you self confidence (Glasgow, client, 
round 1). 
 
It is worth emphasising that this was not a quickly won battle, but required a 
considerable culture change for many people.  During the early days of the zones the 
client-led nature of provision was not being fully explored.  Some partners still saw 
Employment Zones as yet another training scheme driven by national targets.  According 
to one person with long experience of working with the unemployed: 
 
The Employment Zones concept was initially hard to grasp … We had been running ES and 
TEC-backed training and employment initiatives for years and when EZs came along we thought 
this was more of the same, you know, come up with courses first and then pack them in … The 
unemployed frequently came last and you couldn’t really refer to them as clients (North West 
Wales, public sector, round 2).     
 
But the change in ethos very quickly emerged and took root, becoming perhaps one of 
the most important successful innovations associated with the PEZs.  Personal advisers 
were particularly vocal in pointing out the difference which the PEZ approach made to 
their ability to undertake (and enjoy) their work, emphasising how the changing balance 
of power between them and the clients had in some senses made them more 
accountable, which clients tended to respond to positively.  Personal advisers themselves 
stressed how it was that a combination of a positive approach, greater continuity in client 
relations and a voluntary participation environment had helped to transform the advice 
and referral process.  The following comments from a discussion group with personal 
advisers are illustrative: 
 
 The fact that you can say yes is the best thing.  Most of us have worked in ES for years and 
years, and you used to say ‘no, you can’t go to college more than 16 hours’, ‘no, you can’t have 
your benefit if you go to college’, ‘no, you can’t do that course because the TEC won’t pay for it’.  
The best thing I’ve found is you can say ‘yes, you can go to college’, ‘yes, you can keep your 
benefits’, ‘yes, you can do a non-mainstream training course’.  It makes you seem like you’re not 




 You gain the trust of clients.  We never had that before.  We never got the whole picture.  Now 
they learn to trust you… As you know more about them and their family background, the 
chances of helping them into work are much better (Liverpool & Sefton, personal adviser, 
round 3).   
 
 What’s really changed for me was the way clients viewed what we do.  That is a definite change 
for the better.  There’s this sense now that people are more prepared to listen to what you’ve got 
to say.  They accept what you say and our accountability is on the line because we’re more open 
to criticism.  I think it’s a change for the better from the adviser view, and for the client 
(Liverpool & Sefton, personal adviser, round 3). 
 
The alternative view, as already noted, is that on occasion some personal advisers tended 
to become to much taken up by the ‘social work’ dimensions of identifying a client’s 
barriers to employment, which were often rooted in deep-seated personal and family 
problems.  As such there were suspicions among some partners of ‘client capture,’ where 
the emphasis became too much fulfilling the clients’ general wishes rather than their 
much more specific needs in relation to getting employment.  It is important to set such 
criticisms in context: such comments were the exception rather than the rule, partners 
tended to suggest this was a minority problem rather than a widespread issue, and also 
the comments were generally made as part of trying to rationalise the pressure the zones 
came under from central government to become more ‘output’ orientated. 
 
It is also worth noting that some of PEZ partners were concerned that, in wider policy 
circles, a simplified and exaggerated interpretation of the role of the PAs might have 
been gaining undue credibility.  According to one interviewee, ‘That’s where the policy has 
gone wrong.  What’s percolated up to the top is PAs good, Job Centres without PAs bad.  So what do 
they do? You’ve got man-to-man marking now! Every body who’s unemployed gets a PA’ (Liverpool 
& Sefton, voluntary-sector officer, round 3). 
 
An as yet unresolved question concerns the relative importance of personal adviser 
systems per se and the operation of such system in the context of the PEZ policy 
environment.  Many partners argued that it was the latter, more comprehensive approach 
which actually yielded the results:  personal adviser systems, in this perspective, were 
effective by virtue of their embeddedness within a wider policy package (including inter 
alia voluntary participation, distinctive branding and an inter-agency approach).  Others 
argued that the personal adviser system itself was the key ingredient and that this could 
be deployed effectively under a variety of contexts—for example, alongside either 
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 mandatory or voluntary participation rules.  Because these approaches have yet to be 
trialled side-by-side it is impossible to state unequivocally how much value-added 
personal adviser systems can be expected to yield in their own right.  This is perhaps 
another way in which the PEZ experiment has been somewhat truncated. 
 
4.4 Learning for Work 
 
Central to the PEZ approach was avoiding duplication of activities by calling upon 
existing provision as much as possible.  As such whilst the PEZs did engage in some 
innovative new forms of provision, for the most part innovation came through stitching 
together provision in ways tailored to the needs of individual clients.  In this sense the 
actual forms of provision tended not to attract strong criticism or strong praise, more a 
general acknowledgement that in general this aspect of provision was going well.   
 
 What we have now is a much better engineered range of provision than we had before, but it’s 
the same range of provision … We’ve got add-ons, but to the guy in the street who’s been 
through Restarts and been through TfW they would say ‘what’s different here?’ … The PEZ 
would have made some improvement to the lot of local unemployed people, but it wouldn’t have 
been a radical change by any measure (Liverpool & Sefton, training provider, round 3). 
 
Clients on LfW were largely satisfied with their experiences, although reflecting the 
changing pressures to achieve outcomes later in the lifespan of the Zones, one client 
suggested that there was too much pressure to move on:  
 
 [My adviser] is going ‘well you’ve got an NVQ out of it, now you’ve got to find a job’.  But 
without level 3 spraying there’s no way anybody is going to sign me up.  It’s 4 or 5 weeks since 
starting the course.  It’s a 6-month course.  My paperwork is right up to date, but there’s no 
way I’m going to finish that in a month and go out into a garage.  I can’t see the point of them 
saying ‘you’re on EZ we’ve got to find you a job’.  There’s no way I’m going to get it [...] you’ve 
got a 99% chance of walking into a garage at the end, but there’s no chance where we are now 
(Plymouth, client, round 3). 
 
4.5 Neighbourhood Match 
 
Intermediate Labour Market approaches attracted considerable attention from policy 
makers in the late 1990s as a potentially cost effective means for helping the unemployed 
find work.  The basic model involves transfer of benefits and training allowances into a 
single pot to create support for unemployed people who are taken on to ‘work’ in the 
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 ILMs, thus gaining valuable work experience.  It is difficult to generalise the work of the 
ILMs as they have become more diverse but typically they contract with government or 
other bodies to undertake socially-useful activities on the understanding that they will 
provide work experience and training for the unemployed.  Though much of the work is 
what might be deemed as ‘socially useful’ (examples include cycle repair, furniture for 
sale at low cost to unemployed people, and security, gardening, and landscape work for 
local authorities), increasingly some of it is more commercially orientated, for instance a 
call centre service for small firms has been developed in Glasgow.   
 
Under ILMs, the unemployed are taken on as ‘waged workers’ rather than categorised as 
unemployed and indeed in some versions they are encouraged to leave state benefits and 
instead receive an actual wage, taken from the pooled benefits and training funds.  In 
some models, clients have the option of taking ‘benefits plus’ some level of additional 
money.  The waged version offers the value of changed status and improved self-
perception, whilst the ‘benefits plus’ version is particularly valuable for those reliant on 
the benefits system to cover their mortgage interest repayments (the problem being the 
time lag in eligibility for this form of benefit for people signing back on to benefits) and 
those who feared a cut in housing benefits if they signed off their existing benefits.  One 
of the interesting innovations in the PEZs has been the emergence of a ‘benefits passport’ 
whereby clients have been guaranteed a return to benefits at previous levels if they sign 
off to take up a waged-work option or attempt to start up their own businesses. 
 
In contrast to the well-developed infrastructure for Learning for Work, in the area of 
ILMs only Glasgow could boast a well-developed infrastructure, though some early 
projects did exist in Liverpool & Sefton.  However in North West Wales, Plymouth and 
South Tees, ILMs were virtually starting from scratch.  At one level this generated 
considerable early enthusiasm for being able to expand provision for the unemployment 
in radical ways in four of the zones.  At another level, these raised expectations were to 
lead to some later disillusionment about whether the ILM approach had delivered as 
much as had been hoped for.   
 
The experience in Glasgow was rather different, as in the Wise Group and Glasgow 
Works it had the two main ILM pioneers, each with a proven track record.  Rather than 
develop new projects, the Glasgow approach was to use these two existing providers, 
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 albeit that Glasgow Works is essentially a model and umbrella vehicle for ILMs which 
local groups can use to develop new provision.   By and large Glasgow remained immune 
to some of the doubts which beset partners elsewhere, where provision was developed 
specifically for the PEZs and was often costly and time consuming to initiate.   
 
As one partner told us, ‘Neighbourhood Match is working, but it’s a hell of a lot more expensive 
than we ever expected it to be … Please remember that it is very expensive’ (Liverpool & Sefton, 
training provider, round 2).  The cost of such provision, a local provider pointed out, 
must however be seen in the context of continuing weaknesses in the private labour 
market in the Zones: 
 
 One of the main reasons why people are unemployed in an area like Liverpool is basically 
because there aren’t enough jobs.  It’s not because they haven’t got a suit, it’s the jobs don’t exist! 
ILMs are a way of actually giving people meaningful and relevant work experience, effective 
training and providing them with a job—albeit a temporary one.  So you can start to use them 
in a way to bridge a little bit of that gap.  I think the zone has helped to establish some sort of 
priority for ILMs (Liverpool & Sefton, training provider, round 2). 
 
In Plymouth, inexperience and also the well-intentioned desire to get ILMs up and 
running quickly did lead to some problems, including the unique decision of the 
Plymouth partners not to allow a ‘benefits plus’ option, which immediately meant some 
clients would tend to be more cautious about ILM opportunities.  In addition, rather 
loose contracts were initially issued which reflected some local confusion about the role 
of ILMs, in particular how to balance the desire to provide both training and work 
experience. 
 
Whilst clients tended to be reasonably comfortable with ILMs, many pointed out to us 
that they were useful largely as work experience in the absence of a substantial work 
placement initiative among private-sector employers.  There was still a sense, then, in 
which ILMs were not being compared favourably to ‘real’ jobs by clients. 
 
 ILM was [seen as] a universal panacea.  ILM is nothing more than an intermediary step.  It 
isn’t what I’d call a permanent full-time job.  You have no intention of spending the rest of your 
life on ILM (Plymouth, client, round 2). 
 
 In my experience of ILM it sounds a wonderful thing to start with: you’re going to be doing 
proper work and getting a wage.  But when it comes down to it, under the guise of training you 




 Some of the criticisms of ILMs reflected a partial understanding of their role within a 
holistic local regeneration process.  In particular, there were often unrealistic expectations 
of ILMs becoming commercially free-standing at some stage, in spite of their working in 
socially-useful activities which by their nature were at best usually commercially marginal 
areas.  As such, supporters of ILMs tended to counter critics by arguing that in order to 
appreciate the ILM model it was important to judge their outcomes not simply against 
successes in job placement, but also against their wider achievements in meeting local 
social needs. 
 
For most of the PEZs, developing ILMs has been an important learning experience.  It is 
now widely accepted that ILMs constitute an important element—but only one 
element—of a broadly-based and well-founded local provision base.  But as in so many 
other aspects of the PEZ experience, the benefits of ILMs seem more likely to be 
captured in the medium to long term rather than the short term.  And crucially for the 
PEZs, these benefits would not be likely to be evidence within the operational life of the 
PEZ initiative.  The PEZ experience shows that ILM development calls for patience 
from policy-makers and stability from funding providers. 
 
4.6 Business Enterprise 
 
Business Enterprise was the area which attracted least numbers of PEZ clients.  This 
might have been anticipated, given that the main client group had been unemployed for 
over 12 months, and not surprisingly the majority lacked the capital reserves and network 
contacts to start-up successful new businesses.   
 
Whilst partners tended to downplay this aspect of their work, often because they were 
unaware of what was being done locally, those people who opted for provision in this 
area tended to be very positive about their experiences.  As the general framework for 
business support is already well-established in most areas of the country, the PEZs 
generally tended to seek to tap into existing provision.  The main difference that the 
zones made, which clients commented positively on, was the ability to test out an idea 
for the duration of their provision whilst still receiving benefits.  If their venture worked 
they would continue to receive support in becoming self-employed and leaving benefits.  
If the business proved not to be commercially viable clients remained eligible for all their 
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 benefits—as such a major risk element had been taken away.  The example of  Business 
Rehearsal in Plymouth is helpful here.  It allowed clients to retain their benefits while 
developing and operating (rehearsing) a small business for up to six months, during 
which period they could also receive support from business advisers.  One client’s 
experience helps highlight the way in which the system worked. 
 
 Business Rehearsal is really worth it.  It really is.  You can get £400 through achieving one 
unit of an NVQ.  I was unemployed without a penny left.  I went down to see my adviser and 
they said I could have a £400 grant I didn’t have to pay back.  I haven’t got a car and I’m a 
decorator.  I’m working.  I’ve got contracts.  I’ve advertised in shops and those sorts of places.  
I’ve got 42 years experience and references.  I’ve got loads of people who have phoned me up.  
I’m working locally so that I don’t need a van yet, but I’m just starting to get enough money.  
At the end of 6 months all that money is yours.  You get every benefit, plus £20 training 
allowance.  If at the end of 6 months you think ‘…I’m not going to make it, I just haven’t got 
enough coming in’, then you can go back on the dole with your original benefit (Plymouth, 
client, round 2). 
 
4.7 Other aspects of provision and support work for clients 
 
Although the main areas of provision were to be Learning for Work, Neighbourhood 
Match and Business Enterprise, other forms of support were also envisaged within the 
zones, not least the use of personal advisers.  In addition support for child care was 
provided in all zones.  As one of the target client groups was lone parents, this proved 
invaluable and received considerable positive comment from clients. 
 
Taking their cue from ministers’ declared interest in developing personal job accounts, 
some PEZs undertook innovative work in piloting small-scale experiments.  For 
instance, the North West Wales PEZ developed an initiative known as ‘Personal 
Provision,’ announced in its bid document as the fourth element of provision.  Here, 
zone funding was provided for items above £200 which help overcome individual 
participants’ barriers to entering employment.  This can extend the access to training 
courses and it can also be used to enable the client to undertake work experience leading 
directly to employment or self-employment.  Similarly, ‘Barriers to Employment’ enabled 
Employment Service advisers to allocate payments for one-off items, under £200, the 
absence of which is preventing the client returning to work.  Combined, these two 
initiatives have assisted 400 individuals that have been experienced long-term 
unemployment.  According to a personal adviser, Personal Provision is valuable because 
it gives ‘so much flexibility.  We can do quick fixes for clients.  If they have had a job offer but could 
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 not afford to renew their driving licence, for instance, we can act quickly and get them into work (North 
West Wales, round 3). 
 
Similar experiments in creating small discretionary funds for clients to use in innovative 
ways to improve their employability also took place in Glasgow and South Tees.  One 
client in Teesside told us of the value of this local flexibility for him personally: 
 
 I was on Employment Training and got City & Guilds out of that and at the end of the day 
it’s worthless – employers will not take you on without work experience.  I’ve got the paperwork 
but I’ve not had a job in a building site since.  Now I’m trying to set up my own business [but] 
I need a driving licence so that I can move from area to area.  I’ve got on the scheme, 
Employment Zone, to get myself through a driving course and get a driving licence and it’s 
costing me nothing.  Employment Training wouldn’t do that (South Teesside, client, round 
2). 
 
As we have already noted, there was general disappointment among PEZ partners that 
the ‘Permission to Pilot’ initiative hadn’t allowed more projects to go forward to test the 
limits of the benefits system.  One casualty of this process is worth mentioning, both 
because it was in the original bid document for Glasgow PEZ, but also because even 
when Permission to Pilot had been denied, partners attempted to take forward a reduced 
sized version of it, using their own funds.   
 
The Workless Households project was regarded as a critical source of innovation by 
many of the Glasgow partners.  According to one partner: ‘We see it as our signature project, 
in a way… it’s terribly important’.  There was therefore a sense of real disappointment 
among partners about the failure to achieve central support to proceed on their pilot 
schemes.  Turned down by ES head office, local partners decided to go ahead with a 
scaled-down version of the project.  With funding from Scottish Homes and the GDA, 
pilots were proposed for two areas of Glasgow, with the aim to move beyond looking at 
the single person to consider a whole household and its various welfare supports.  The 
intention was to demonstrate whether this approach could help in overcoming the 
‘benefits trap’ of households with multiple potential income earners.  Key features were: 
experimenting to see whether transfer of housing benefits to help provide PEZ support 
could overcome some barriers; providing high levels of caseworker support; and 
considering tailoring provision (e.g. on ILMs) in relation to two or more clients from 




 However, this aspiration has not been met by the zone, in part because the extent of the 
co-ordination problems was not initially fully anticipated, but mainly due to, first, the 
need for primary legislation to ‘free up’ the complex welfare benefits structure, and 
second, the practical difficulties involved in identifying family ties, reorganising benefits, 
or simply providing assurances of no loss of benefits.  The two pilots set up by the zone 
to help some 80 families have therefore produced little in the way of practical support to 
the families to date, but are regarded as a having been a very valuable research resource 
which has left partners optimistic that a practical ‘whole household project’ will be 
brought to fruition in the future, albeit as a legacy of the PEZ rather than a part of it. 
 
4.8 Lessons on meeting client needs 
 
Clients were overwhelmingly positive in their endorsement of the principles under which 
the PEZs were constructed.  In particular they valued the contribution of personal 
advisers and the ability to tailor their own mix of provision to improve their job-
readiness.  Whilst partners and PEZ workers tended to be similarly positive at the general 
level, they did point to some of the problems which a client-led focus entailed and also 
some of the areas in which provision had not quite lived up to initial expectations.  As 
such the lessons outlined here are generally positive about the actual work of PEZs but a 
little bit more cautious on their replicability, particularly in the context of the radically 
altered frameworks of the FFEZs. 
 
 Successful initiatives emerged aimed at targeting particular client groups—especially 
those with mental health problems and a long history of social exclusion, and those 
currently on probation. 
 Preparing individuals for entry into ‘real jobs’ can be a long-term process, involving 
the removal of multiple job-related and non-job related barriers.  Knitting together 
different aspects of provision in personally-tailored ways helped in addressing the 
complexity of some people’s barriers to employment. 
 Effective personal adviser systems were developed, demonstrating the benefits of 
‘relationship continuity’ both for clients and front-line workers and succeeding in 
conveying to clients a positive ‘message’ concerning the aims of the PEZ.  A mutual 
commitment to PEZs appears to have emerged between clients and advisers. 
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  On-going learning experience in terms of managing client choice, linking provision 
more clearly to both client and labour market needs. 
 The voluntary nature of PEZ was held by partners, clients and advisers to be a 
central feature of the success of the zones, improving the qualitative nature of 
relationships between clients and advisers, and clients and potential employers. 
 Clients noted changing perception of ES local workers. Where previously the 
perception was often negative, of policing a punitive benefits system, increasingly a 
more positive stance was noted, of supporting quality labour market interventions. 
 A combination of limited funds to initiate new provision and the uneven quality of 
inherited local provision from previous initiatives placed real constraints on what 
could be achieved through innovations in advice and referral systems. 
 Local labour market conditions are important in shaping programme outcomes and 
design parameters, in particular where local demand deficit exists. 
 Willingness of local partners and agencies to bend programme participation rules in 
order to meet individual needs. 
 Positive support from some businesses, although in general it proved difficult to find 
work placement opportunities for PEZ clients. 
 Progress in overcoming cynicism, fatalism and disinterest amongst many individual 
members of the client group. 
 Particularly in contrast to the previous ‘training for training’s sake’ system introduced 
throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, PEZ provision proved more responsive to the 
individual needs of clients who felt more in control of their own destiny. 
 Some success in developing new ILM provision and in convincing local partners of 
the value of ILM approaches; a secure basis has been established for the future.  
development of ILM experiments (mostly through non-ES/DfEE programmes) 
 The Business Enterprise facet of the PEZs proved successful in many instances, but 
retained a low profile in terms of the available range of provision. 
 Valuable attempts were made to begin to construct prototype Personal Job Accounts, 
providing flexible forms of tailored local provision. 
 Early success in branding the PEZ as ‘something different’ with clients and (to a 




 5.  Conclusions 
Large amounts of public money are spent in areas of high unemployment.  This includes money 
spent separately on benefit, training and programmes.  Ministers wish to see this money used 
more flexibly and innovatively in certain areas of the country, designated as Employment Zones 
(Employment Zone Prospectus, September 1997: 4). 
 
The Prototype Employment Zones represented a bold experiment in welfare-to-work 
policy.  Unfortunately, the results of this experiment have been inconclusive.  Following 
what all now acknowledge to have been a slow start, the PEZs were required to work 
within a tighter and more output-orientated operating environment.  And although 
outcomes began to improve, the direction of national policy seemed to be moving away 
from the PEZ approach.  When the proposals for Fully-Fledged Employment Zones 
were announced, many people involved with the PEZs at the local level felt that they 
were no longer at the pioneering edge of welfare-to-work policy and, if anything, working 
against the grain of future national policy.  In policy terms, they have never recovered 
from this implicit marginalisation.  As one local partner put it, ‘People have just taken their 
eye off the ball and said “Well, this game’s dead”.  It’s sort of like Jurassic Park now’ (Glasgow, 
provider partner, round 3). 
 
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the PEZ experience represents something of a 
missed opportunity.  Several promising policy innovations were introduced by the PEZs, 
but the short life of the initiative undermined the scope for organic policy development 
at the local scale.  Some PEZ partners see the initiative as a victim of the kind of short-
termism in policy development that the Employment Zones were intended to overcome.  
A rather unfocused early phase of development, however, created conditions from which 
the PEZ initiative never really recovered.  In many ways the fundamental evaluation at 
stake here is how harshly the PEZ experiment should be judged in light of this faltering 
start.  On the one hand, to expect an ambitious experiment to yield immediate outcomes 
is clearly unrealistic, yet it is also true that the acid test of any welfare-to-work innovation 
must surely lie with its outcomes.  Certainly in operational terms, front-line workers insist 
that the PEZ regime has become much more focused and effective, and in fact most will 
defend the PEZ in ways that they would not do other local programmes.  As one such 
staff member explained, ‘If it started now the results would be so different.  It really is a 




 In responding to criticisms from Government advisers and officials, local PEZ partners 
and workers frequently argued that there has been a rush to judgement in this area of 
welfare-to-work policy. Most concede that a slow start was made, but point out that this 
was an inevitable by-product of establishing an inclusive, partnership approach to policy 
development, coupled with the imperative of designing a delivery system sensitive to 
clients’ needs.  Even if there may be an element of special pleading here, the PEZs 
certainly have a case when they argue that the rules and goals of the Employment Zone 
initiative seemed to change mid-way through the experiment.  And there is 
understandable sensitivity amongst many local partners that the PEZ experiment seems 
to have been branded a ‘failure’ in many quarters.  As a Glasgow board member 
observed, ‘Personally I think it [PEZ] has worked, but yet no one’s learning from it’ (Glasgow, 
community sector, round 3). The important thing here is that the PEZ approach 
developed organically over time – it did this partly through internal learning processes 
and in part through having to respond to external criticisms of performance, such as an 
early consultancy report which criticised the early performance of the PEZs. Although 
such criticisms often seemed harsh at the time to local partners and workers, in some 
cases they did prove salutary reminders of the need to blend national priorities with local 
experimentation. Indeed, responding to external criticisms was very much a part of the 
PEZ learning process.  
 
In this evaluation we have been able to point to a wide number of areas in which the 
PEZs have made significant steps in advancing the Government’s welfare-to-work 
agenda. Some of these key lessons have been carried forward into the fully-fledged 
employment zones, whilst others will be acted upon locally within other funding regimes. 
But perhaps the key lesson is to pay more attention to the learning processes embedded 
in initiatives such as the PEZs, observing how they adapted to the inevitable problems 
which beset bold new initiatives, from grand design to local problems. The key to this 
learning process is to use appropriate evaluation at appropriate times. This sort of 
evaluation culture does not appear to have been well embedded in the policy process 
surrounding Employment Zones. The selectivity of the learning from the Prototype 
Employment Zones ought to be a matter of some concern as it is not clear that the fully-




 Perhaps what is most startling about the prototypes is the nature of the widespread 
support they received from local partners. It is also very rare to find a labour market 
policy such as this engendering such enthusiasm among both partners and clients. But 
the remarkable thing about the zones is that through all the vicissitudes of policy shifts, 
few if any appeared to doubt that the fundamental design of the PEZs represented a 
major breakthrough in policy for the better. Partners tended to be energised by their 
engagement with an initiative designed to help some of the most difficult to reach 
unemployed clients, tackling social exclusion in a meaningful way which incorporated 
clients. Indeed, the great achievement of the zones was to experiment with giving clients 
greater power to improve their labour market position without fear of losing benefit 
entitlements or facing punitive sanctions. This empowerment in turn ensured that the 
provision offered to be clients had to be of a high quality.  
 
One of the key findings of this qualitative and contextual evaluation has been that it was 
not single ingredients that made the PEZ approach so popular, such as the use of 
personal advisers, but rather the wider system design and the surrounding ethos of client-
centredness. To appreciate the achievements made under the PEZ approach, it is 
necessary to examine it holistically, examining how it worked as system level, which is 
exactly what this report has sought to do.   
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